This study explores the effects of electoral rules on political polarization in the legislative branch of government.
different electoral rules in Brazil take the same district and transform it into either a single or multi-member district.
The study of polarization in the U.S. Congress has gained scientific rigor with both the application of spatial models and the empirical estimation of ideology using large data sets. This confluence resulted in the ubiquitous mode of analysis enabled by algorithms like NOMINATE and Optimal Classification. In this study, an extension of NOMINATE called WNOMINATE is used. WNOMINATE takes the roll call records of legislators and two policy dimensions as input, calculates their proximity to each other, and returns the position of legislators in the policy space spanned by those dimensions. The two dimensions are fiscal and social ones, and they are constrained by the unit Euclidean circle. The algorithm normalizes the positions such that politicians that are conservative in both fiscal and social issues receive coordinates on the positive orthant. History, detailed theoretical explanation, as well as the application of this methodology to American Politics can be found in Rosenthal and Poole (2007) and McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) 1 .
The U.S. Congress presents an added difficulty when comparing chambers though; the pool from which the subjects are drawn differs between the House and the Senate. The members of the House are selected from smaller districts, while members of the Senate come from the states. This is not the case with Brazil's Congress, and this feature is explored in this paper. Brazilian legislative elections on the federal level provide me with an institutional design well-suited to test the effects of two electoral rules on political polarization, namely the pluralitymajority and proportional rules. The electoral features that enable this test to occur are: first, and most important, each state covers a single district only and there is no further division within it; and second, the electoral rules differ from one chamber to the other. Hence, the same district can be a single-member district in the Senate's case, and a multi-member district in the House's case.
Literature Review
The first two pieces of work on polarization were Rosenthal and Poole (1984) , which looks into interest groups' classifications of legislator behavior, and Rosenthal and Poole (1985) , which stated the use of roll call data directly via NOMINATE. The seminal work in polarization literature is Rosenthal and Poole (1997) , revised as Rosenthal and Poole (2007) . In this book the authors seek to understand the structure of congressional voting in the U.S., and to explain the political realignment in American history. The impact of committees and interest groups are also investigated. The main finding of this research is that American politics have had alternate times of polarization in the past, but that a strong and increasing polarization pattern has arisen in the last few decades. Among the exogenous causes of this phenomenon are income inequality and immigration. A study that claims different findings on polarization of American politics is Evans (2003) . The author uses alternative statistical methods, along with survey data, to argue that American voters are not as polarized as legislators when it comes to economic issues, but the polarization of voters on moral issues is increasing 2 .
In the present study I do not necessarily have the American case in mind, as I seek to unravel the existence of an institutional cause of polarization. My research approach is reversed; I posit an institutional cause of polarization and look for an empirical validation of the hypothesis. Also, I am interested in the behavior of the legislators only, and not of the voters. One previous study that links electoral rules and legislative behavior is Carrol and Eichorst (2013) , where the authors show that the greater the competition, the higher the predictability of legislators' behavior. The findings in my study however could have arisen independent of the relationship in Carrol and Eichorst (2013) . This is because it is possible to have electoral competition independent of the electoral rule.
Admittedly and intuitively, one should expect greater competition correlating with greater number of parties, but this relation can be upside down. If there are two strong parties and no others, there must be more competition than a situation with one strong party and many electorally insignificant ones.
The methodological foundations of the polarization research borrowed the Item Response Theory (IRT) from Psychology. In comparing attitudes among individuals towards similar questions, IRT provided a way of not only ordering subjects by their abilities or preferences, but also measuring the distance among those subjects. What political science researchers began to do then was to apply the IRT methodology to analyze and quantify ideological mappings, in Congress and Executive branches 3 , first through the use of interest groups' ratings of politicians, and later through the use of roll call data via NOMINATE. (POOLE, 2005) provides technical work on this issue 4 . Here I use roll call data, which has become the standard way of investigating ideological mappings, for it is much more objective than interest groups' evaluations. An introductory tutorial of the methodology utilized in the classification of legislators using roll call data is Wiseman, Everson and Valelly (2008/2009 ), while Poole (1998) provides an intellectual-and as non-technical as it can ever be-recount of the origin and development of the NOMINATE family of methods. There remains only a few studies dealing with the topic of polarization in Brazilian politics. Leoni (2002) was the first study to bring the NOMINATE technology to Brazilian politics. The article describes the ideological map of parties in the House and the first three presidents after redemocratization, covering the 1991-1998 period. His results are in favor of a low dimensionality with the left-right spectrum explaining most of the legislative behavior. Morgenstern (2004) looks at the period from 1995 to 1998 and argues that the Congress has more power than the President when it comes to lawmaking. Desposato (2006b) studies the same legislatures as Morgenstern, but to test a party-switching model. Zucco Jr. and Lauderdale (2011) use survey data to correct ideological mappings using roll call data, and find that there also exists a governmentopposition cleavage in Brazilian congress, apart from the left-right dispute. Our research will encompass this issue when dealing with coalitions instead of parties. Desposato and Cunow (2011) use campaign contributions for the 2010 3 For the classification of the Judiciary branch see Bailey (2007) . 4 It is noteworthy that all this literature has relied on the assumption that the appropriate distance to study decision theory is the Euclidean one. In Eguia (2012) , the author claims that the Minkowski distance with = 1 is better suited to describe utility functions. Let the vectors 1 , 2 ∈ ℝ represent the ideal points of legislators 1 and 2; the Minkowski distance between them is defined by
presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections to estimate ideal points in Brazil. Their approach enables them to also grasp the ideology of the candidates who lost in the elections. They find mixed evidence of the impact of electoral rules on polarization. The first attempt to investigate the effect of electoral rules on polarization in Brazil was Desposato (2006a) . In this study, the author uses a dispersion model to assess the legislators' behaviors on the Senate and the House.
He finds no evidence of any impact of electoral rules on dispersion of legislatives of the same party, but only three legislatures were analyzed. This paper attempts to improve on that study by analyzing all the first six legislatures in the democratic period, and also by taking the coalitions into consideration. Shor and McCarty (2011) , one that could also be replicated for the Brazilian case.
Electoral Rules and Polarization
The Brazilian political system is more similar to the American one than to most of those in Europe, in that the presidential elections are separated from the congressional ones 5 . With regards to congressional elections though, Brazilian electoral rules vary according to the chamber. In Brazil, the district from which the representatives are elected is the same political territory as the state from which the senators are elected. In other words, the states are the districts. Moreover, there is one feature that has not been taken into consideration in this discussion; the ability to vote with the party. Note that for a politician who is not a head of a party, his or her power in determining the party's agenda is small. Therefore, if the politician's policy preferences are not exactly the same as the party ones, there will be a cost, in terms of effort, for the politician to support the party's exact agenda. The partisan behavior then will be a function of the distance between the politician and the party, and the value he places in policy and officeholding. If someone places more value in the office than in the policy, then it will be easier for him or her to follow the party, holding fixed the ideological distance between the party and the politician. Conversely, if the value placed in the office is held fixed, then the closer the party and politician are ideologically, the easier for him to vote with the party. This will be an important issue, as we will see presently,
for the party will expect a "better" behavior from the senators than from the members of the House.
Hence, when a politician is deciding on the type of nomination to procure, it is not clear whether the present expected value of a seat in the Senate is always greater than a seat in the House, i.e., whether it is the case that for every politician it is better to try to run for the Senate than the House 10 . As I will show presently, Mignozzetti, Bernabel and Gaudino (2011) . In this work a Monte Carlo simulation was run using WNOMINATE estimates, where the representational proportions were corrected and the new seats were filled with the proportions each party had previously. The malaportionment might affect policy-making but the effect is mediated by a correlation between state and popular vote for the parties. 10 This cost/benefit relation is then blurred because the problem is pushed to an individual level and not the aggregated one. Such a micro-causation reasoning will remain blackboxed in this study because we are more interested in the aggregated effect of electoral rules per se, and not in individual evaluations of office and policy. What matters for the present study is that different rules select different behavior. One can also estimate an expected utility function to test the hypothesis that the seats in the Senate are more attractive. A possible model to start with could take the senator's eight-year salary and multiply it by the probability of being nominated to run for the office and the probability of winning the election, all this multiplied by the party's expectation of loyalty and, finally, multiplied by the inverse of the ideological distance between the prospective candidate and the party. For the expected utility of a House seat, one could take the four-year salary of a representative and multiply it by the probability of securing nomination by the party and the probability of being elected, all this multiplied by the party's expectation of loyalty the different offices appeal differently to distinct candidate types, according to their ability to fulfill the party's expectations. Therefore, the electoral rule may be the very mechanism through which confidence and loyalty bounds are tied together; in other words, the channeling of polarization may be influenced by the electoral rule. Suppose that for any reason, a politician secured his indication as candidate. Once in office, the candidate should reciprocate by voting with his party, in order to ensure that in the next election, the party will enable him to defend his seat. Hence, it can very well be the fact that as a more restrictive procedure, the plurality-majority rule used in the election to the Senate induces more partisan behavior. Of course, a person can be loyal to a party before even becoming a candidate, and this loyalty must be a crucial factor, among others, that induces the party to provide him with the opportunity to run for office.
This framework resembles the screening problems in which a principal offers a menu of tasks with different levels of difficulty, and the agent self-selects for a task according to his ability. Here the two tasks would be the run for a seat and, finally, multiplied by the inverse of the ideological distance between the prospective candidate and the party. It is not within the scope of this work to run this estimation. Once elected, any politician should abide by the re-election rationale mentioned above. The final test between the pre-and post-election effects could be conducted by estimating how the same person behaves in the House and in the Senate. This task is left for a future study.
The same re-election logic does not work as well for the House though, because a good candidate can bring benefits to the party even without being loyal.
As the electoral rule for the House is proportional with an open list, a strong candidate may pull some other winners with him, and his vote will also count for a smaller fraction of the total. It therefore follows that even if this same candidate should misbehave in his seat, the party could internalize this cost, for the representative could again bring more elected candidates with himself the next time round.
Finally, it is noteworthy that this paper is attempting to solely measure the effect of a cause. Many other processes and variables concur to explain legislator behavior. However, it is not my intention to make thorough predictions about legislative decision-making. The idea is simply to elucidate first a qualitative finding-the existence of an influence of the electoral rules on the polarization of the legislative bodies-and then make an attempt to quantify that effect. One study that would walk alongside this one is Neiva and Izumi (2012) . One finding in that paper is that senators substitute votes more in line with the Executive branch.
These phenomena dwell under the party-discipline type of events. Another study of this kind is Melo and Batista (2012) . Focusing on the higher chamber-and this is the novelty on the paper-the authors claim that party discipline in the Brazilian
Senate compares with that of the House. These processes could, for instance, lead to increased polarization in the legislature.
Data
The case study explored in this paper was produced using roll call data input ideology on it prior to the estimation. The WNOMINATE function in the R package requires the researcher to pin down the dimensions by selecting a legislator who is notoriously a social and fiscal conservative. With this information, the algorithm returns dimensions that are aligned with ideology. The process would work fine if I used a social and fiscal liberal legislator, but the estimates would come out inverted. One could alternatively "create" a coalition/opposition dimension, and this could explain some legislative behavior. However, the fact that the analysis in this paper found very good estimates using the algorithm in its original mode provides us with greater confidence in the validity of the method.
Four estimations were run for each chamber separately. First, the means of the clustered parties' ideal points over the whole period were estimated. Then, those means were disaggregated by legislature. Third, the legislators were 12 A good reference on the measurement methods and software is found in Poole (2005) . The reference for the WNOMINATE package is Lo (2007) . 13 The second dimension represents where the legislator or party dwells in the social liberal-conservative spectrum.
aggregated according to the coalitions to whom they belonged, i.e., they were either members of the government coalition or not, and the effect was estimated for the whole period. Finally, the coalitions' behavior was estimated for each legislature separately. The estimations were run for every member of the Congress, and thence everyone participates in the results for the coalitions.
However, the results for the parties cover only the main parties; Worker's Party The ideal experiment to test whether the electoral rule affects legislator behavior would require the same legislator to be elected for both chambers at the same time, through different electoral rules, and voting on the same bills. This is probably not how most parliamentary bodies throughout the world work, and certainly it is not so for the Brazilian case. With the impossibility of a natural experiment, the identification strategy relies on the Brazilian electoral and legislative design. Remember that for electoral purposes, only the electoral rules distinguish how legislators are elected for the different chambers. This means that the district and the state are the same thing, and there are no demographic confounders in the analysis, for senators and representatives from the same state face the same constituency.
Moreover, every bill has to be voted on in both chambers in order to become law, and if one chamber makes amendments to a bill, these changes also have to be voted on in the other chamber. Hence, it is not the case that polarization occurs because of the kind of issues raised in the different chambers. These characteristics provide us with a suitable environment to test the effect of the electoral rules on polarization. Evidently, a better test would have legislators being randomly assigned to run for an office across different chambers. However, if there is a selection problem in the sense that one type of legislators select itself, or is selected by the party, to one of the chambers while another type is assigned to another chamber, this does not necessarily invalidate the hypothesis that the electoral rule is the polarization mechanism. If these types of legislators are in some manner correlated with the electoral rule, then the hypothesis remains sound. This possible mechanism will last black-boxed until data is gathered on possible causes of selection bias; for example, seniority in the party, previous loyalty, popularity, and economic power. Such a dataset is however not yet available.
Results
The main hypothesis tested in this study is that the Senate treatment, i.e., the plurality-majority rule, has a positive effect in causing polarization. Two sets of strategies were used to estimate the effect of electoral rule on polarization: the aggregated effect in the whole period and the effect separated by legislature.
Within these two sets, a further division is made in taking either the four main parties individually, or the coalitions they formed. The party's or coalition's ideological mean was estimated using WNOMINATE. This algorithm takes roll call data to order legislators relatively to their peers. Even though the different sorts of bills that are voted constitute a multidimensional space, it is usually the case that the behavior of legislators on any bill is predictable by one or two dimensions; the economic and social ones. The accuracy of these predictions will appear presently.
More than ordering the legislators, WNOMINATE estimates the Euclidean distance among them in two dimensions, and in this way every individual is located on a unit disc. For the numerical analysis that follows, only the legislators' coordinate in the first dimension was taken into consideration. The first dimension, the economic one, describes how legislators locate on the usual left-right spectrum, and is the most explicative, or predictive, dimension. This means that the behavior of a legislator in this dimension can be used to predict how the same legislator is going to vote in other dimensions. For the sake of rigor, one may say that in this study, polarization is being investigated in terms of the economic spectrum. There is evidence that the main hypothesis is true, i.e., the plurality-majority rule has a positive effect on polarization, although not all of the findings are unequivocal in confirming this. shows the distribution of cutting lines. We can see the cutting-lines plot below, and an explanation will be given presently. The screen plot shows the factor analysis in which gains in explanation are still to be obtained when we increase the dimensionality of the legislatures in the model. In contrast to U.S. legislatures, Brazilian legislatures present a higher dimensionality, for the line flattens out only after the eighth value. At each value on the horizontal axis, the value on the vertical axis shows the gain in explanation moving away from the previous dimensionality.
Aggregated effect for parties
We can see that substantive gains in explanation can be achieved using two dimensions instead of one, or four instead of three, for example. After the eighth dimension no significant gain is obtained. Still, for the purposes of this study, this higher dimensionality does not represent a threat, since finding polarization on the first dimension will already evince confirmation of the hypothesis. Finally, the cutting lines displayed are a random sample of how legislators were separated in the roll calls, and we can again see that most of them separate legislators in the first dimension. As the Euclidean distance is used, these lines are the separating hyperplanes in two dimensions 15 . Note that superimposing the cutting lines plot on the coordinates plot results in the separation of PT members and PFL-DEM ones.
Even the more horizontal lines separate these two sets of legislators, which indicates that among the four main parties in Brazil, PT is the most fiscal and social liberal party, while PFL-DEM is the most fiscal and social conservative one. 15 A hyperplane ∈ ℝ is the set of points ∈ ℝ such that 〈a, x〉 = , with ∈ ℝ , and ∈ ℝ; i.e., = {x: 〈a, x〉 = }. The hyperplane separates two sets X, and Y if for every ∈ , 〈 , 〉 ≥ and, for every ∈ , 〈 , 〉 ≤ . (2015) 9 (2) 81 -108 
Here the results are 0.55 and 0.59 in one and two dimensions, respectively. An APRE equal to zero means that the model does not explain anything, while an APRE equal to 1 means that the model provides a perfect classification. The Geometric Mean Probability (GMP) demonstrates whether the overall classification is accurate, with the model being better than an educated guess. In other words, a fair coin toss would correctly predict half of the time how a legislator would vote, and the GMP shows whether the model is better than a fair coin toss. Formally, following Poole (2005) , we have that:
where is the index for Yea and Nay, is the probability of voting for choice , and = 1 if the legislator's actual choice is , and 0 otherwise". Then we have
dimensionality is small. Table 01 shows the first coordinate estimates for the parties' aggregated means, taking the whole period of study into account. All of the estimates are as expected. PT's coordinate for the Senate is to the left of its coordinate for the House, and for all the other three parties, the coordinate for the Senate is to the right of the coordinate for the House. Remember that PMDB was a center-right party for the majority of the time period considered in the study, so it is reasonable that it would receive positive coordinates estimates.
A t-test was run with the null hypothesis being that there was no increase in the "extremeness" in the legislators' behavior in the Senate compared to the House. The increase in the polarity was found to be statistically significant with a 95% level for PSDB and PFL-DEM, with a 90% level for PT, and statistically insignificant for PMDB. This statistical analysis therefore presents evidence that legislators in the Senate are more polarized than in the House, and therefore hypotheses 01 and 02 are not falsified by these results. These results become
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blurred, however, when parties are disaggregated by legislature and also when studying the coalitions instead of parties.
Time series for parties
The effect of each separate party in each legislature is explored below.
There were six legislatures in the period studied, two chambers, and the categorization party/coalition. Hence, there are 24 sets of estimates. In practically all of them, the Correct Classification is around 90%, the APRE is 0.6 and the GMP PFL's behavior was in accordance with the expectations in the periods 1989-1990 and 1999-2002 only. Finally, PMDB demonstrated more polarized behavior in the Senate in 1995-1998, 2003-2006, and 2007-2010. As a simple measure of success of this hypothesis, the instances where the polarization was as expected were counted and divided by the opportunities to be as expected, i.e., the number of times a party behaved as it "should" was added and divided by the total number of possible times a party could have behaved as it "should". Consequently, out of 23 opportunities to corroborate the claim, 13 successes were observed; a 56% rate of success. Separating this by parties' orientations, the right-wing parties had 14 opportunities and the polarization in the Senate was higher in only four instances. It is noteworthy though, that for the 17 In 1986, the 48 th legislature was elected with the main task of writing the current 
Time series for coalitions

Conclusion and future research
Political polarization is an important issue in American and European politics, and has been under scholarly investigation for some time now. It also appears to be an increasingly important feature of Brazilian politics, one that is talked about in journalistic accounts and informal chats but yet to receive much attention in academia. This paper investigates whether electoral rules affect polarization in the Brazilian legislative branch. Specifically, I compare the plurality-majority rule used in the Senate with the proportional rule used in the House of Representatives.
The hypothesis that the plurality-majority rule induces more polarization is supported by data, but not to its full extent. In the comprehensive test, using the aggregate data for almost all legislatures in the democratic period, the Senate treatment had a positive effect in causing its legislators to behave more extremely.
This claim is not as apparent as when the data by legislature and coalition are separated. In general, left-wing parties and coalitions are more affected by the treatment than their right-wing counterparts.
Comparing the comprehensive treatment effects of the aggregated cases with the heterogeneous ones in the legislature-by-legislature instances is difficult because of software specificities. The particular issue lies in fixing fiscal and social conservative legislators in the complete data set in order to determine the polarity
